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17 Narrative processes of innovation
and stability within the dialogical self
Miguel M. Gonc¸alves and Anto´nio P. Ribeiro
In dialogical self theory (DST), the way dialogical relations allow
innovation and transformation of the previous dialogical patterns is of
central importance (Hermans 2004). In this chapter we explore a dialo-
gical process through which innovation is aborted in psychotherapy – a
cyclical movement between two opposing voices, one dominant that
organizes the client’s problematic self-narrative, and one innovative,
non-dominant voice. We also discuss two different paths of escaping this
cyclical movement. In the first path the innovative voice gains power
over the previously dominant one, while in the second path the two
opposing voices engage in dialogue, transforming them. These processes
will be illustrated with two different cases from psychotherapy. Finally,
we analyse the implications of our findings by DST.
Self-narratives and the dialogical self
Self-development is regulated by processes of construction and recon-
struction of meanings which occur in the context of narrating oneself to
others. Each narrative account has external audiences or, as with stories
told silently to oneself, internal audiences (Hermans 2003).
However, constructing a self-narrative, that is, a self-told life story by
which the singular events narrated come to be articulated, is not simply a
matter of organizing life events as they occur. In fact, it also entails a
process of selection and synthesis of life experience (McAdams 1993)
since only a small part of the multitude of the person’s experiences is
incorporated into the self-narrative (White and Epston 1990). This
process of self-narrative construction is dialogical, in the sense that a
self-narrative, as Hermans and Kempen (1993) have clearly shown, is
not the result of an omniscient narrator, but the result of the dynamic
interplay between the positions of the self, or I-positions, which organize
the self at a given moment. These several I-positions may then animate
inner and outer dialogues, in which several ‘voices’ can be heard and give
meaning to the current experience.
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In sum, self-narratives are the outcome of dialogical processes of
negotiation, tension, disagreement, alliance and so on, between different
voices of the self (Hermans and Hermans-Jansen 1995).
Problematic self-narratives
Self-narrative presents a meaningful framework of understanding life
experiences, triggering repetition (Michel and Wortham 2002). This
repetition becomes a problem if the self-told life story’s content is
‘unhelpful, unsatisfying, and dead-ended’ and if ‘these stories do not
sufficiently encapsulate the person’s lived experience’ (White and
Epston 1990: 14); that is, if the self-narrative is too rigid and system-
atically excludes experiences not congruent with it. Neimeyer et al.
(2006) refer to this type of problematic self-narratives as dominant
narratives, in the sense that there is a restriction in the meanings
framed by the self-narrative. In such a case, they lead to applications
of general rules (such as self-devaluation in depression) to the daily life
context, becoming restrictive of clients’ experiences, given that the
same theme keeps repeating itself. Dominant self-narratives emerge
in the client’s dialogue, usually by the emphasis on a main theme,
which can be a specific problem or a problematic situation, or even a
set of recurrent themes.
As stated byHermans andHermans-Jansen, a problematic self-narrative
is a ‘narrative reduced to a single theme’ (1995: 164). Obviously, we do
not think that all forms of dominance are problematic. Most of the time,
the self is stabilized around a type of dominant narrative, which is flexible
enough to allow other narrative accounts subsequently to come to the
foreground. By dominant narrative, Neimeyer et al. (2006) refer to a kind
of dominance that precludes any flexibility to allow other narrative
accounts to play a role in a person’s life. This is akin to what White and
Epston (1990) designate as problem-saturated narrative, in the sense that
the problematic story totalizes the self, making other possible narrative
accounts invisible. Thus, from now on, we use the term ‘dominant narra-
tive’, implying this problematic facet, which results from the lack of
flexibility and from excessive redundancy.
Dominant self-narratives are characterized by an asymmetrical rela-
tionship between the different I-positions involved. There is an I-position
or a coalition of I-positions that tries to totalize the interchange
(Cooper 2004), insisting on telling the same story over and over again.
It is this redundancy that constitutes the problematic nature of the
dominant self-narrative, given that other possible I-positions, some of
them more viable for the current situation, are silenced or rejected.
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The result of this type of I-position arrangement mirrors an attempt to
deny the dialogical nature of existence and communication (Linell and
Markova´ 1993).
The entry way for narrative reconstruction:
innovative moments
As Bakhtin (1984/2000) suggested, the attempt to suppress the other
(external or internalized) is never totally accomplished (Gonc¸alves and
Guilfoyle 2006; Salgado and Gonc¸alves 2007; Valsiner 2004). Thus,
internal (and external) voices are not inert and refuse to be treated as
objects, devoid of agency. They could be silenced but they are still
there, and power unbalances may occur that bring these silenced
voices from the background to the foreground (Hermans 2004).
According to this view, dominant self-narratives can be challenged by
the emergence and amplification of ‘novel ways of thinking, interact-
ing, and behaving that the client narrates in the therapeutic conversa-
tion, which are different from the rule(s) he or she usually applies to
his or her life’ (Santos and Gonc¸alves 2009: 493). We consider these
exceptions to the dominant self-narrative – which we call innovative
moments (IMs)1 – as new emergent meanings that have the latent power
to promote change in psychotherapy (Gonc¸alves et al. 2009; Gonc¸alves
et al. 2010). Dialogically, IMs are opportunities for new I-positions to
emerge and tell their own stories, different from the dominant self-
narrative, or even for non-dominant I-positions to move from the
background to the foreground. If these alternative I-positions support
each other and are amplified in the therapeutic conversation, they may
result in the emergence of a network of interconnected I-positions
which compete with the formerly dominant ones, attenuating their
strength, and thereby promoting self-narrative transformation. In ther-
apy, every time these dominated voices are heard, a novelty emerges in
the self-system, which we call an IM. An IM is thus an exception to
the rule which organizes the dominant self-narrative. As we shall see
below, some exceptions are more powerful than others, some may
emerge without significant change in the self-system equilibrium, and
others disrupt more easily the dominant self-narrative, creating self-
development.
Previous research has consistently shown that IMs can be reliably
identified, using the innovative moments coding system (IMCS)
(Gonc¸alves, Ribeiro, Matos et al. in press), and that they occur
in psychotherapeutic change in different models of brief therapy
(Gonc¸alves et al. 2010). Furthermore, research suggests that there
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are five different categories of IMs, which correspond to different
narrative processes, namely:
1. Action IMs are specific behaviours which challenge the dominant self-
narrative.
2. Reflection IMs are thoughts, feelings, intentions, projects or other
cognitive products which challenge the dominant self-narrative.
3. Protest IMs entail new behaviours (like action IMs) and/or thoughts
(like reflection IMs) which challenge the dominant self-narrative,
representing a refusal of its assumptions. This active refusal is the
key feature that allows the distinguishing of protest from action and
reflection.
4. Reconceptualization IMs are the most complex type of innovations.
The client not only describes some form of contrast between present
and past (e.g. ‘Now I’ve changed X or Y’), but he also understands
the processes which allowed this transformation.
5. Performing change (previously named as new experiences) IMs are
new aims, experiences, activities or projects, anticipated or in action,
as a consequence of meaningful changes developed so far.
Thus far, findings from IMs in psychotherapy research have shown that
poor and good outcome cases tend to be similar in the beginning of the
therapeutic process, both characterized by IMs of action, reflection and
protest. In the middle of the treatment, two significant differences start
to differentiate good from poor outcome cases. First, action, reflection
and protest IMs, which are dominant in the initial phase of therapy,
usually increase their presence in good outcome cases and remain stable
or even decrease in poor outcome cases. Second, and more important, as
we shall see below, reconceptualization and performing change emerge
and increase until the end of the treatment in good outcome cases, and
are virtually absent in poor outcome ones (Matos et al. 2009).
From these studies our research team developed a heuristic model of
change (Gonc¸alves et al. 2010) which posits reconceptualization as a
central feature of successful psychotherapy. According to this model,
action, reflection and protest IMs emerge in the beginning of the thera-
peutic process, starting the development of novelty emergence. How-
ever, the emergence of reconceptualization in the middle and late phases
of the therapeutic process is central in developing and sustaining mean-
ingful change. Two main features of reconceptualization are central in
this process: it establishes a contrast between the formerly dominant
position and the innovative position, and it allows access to how this
transformation between the former and the new position occurred.
Thus, reconceptualization posits the person as an author of the change,
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given the access to the process through which change is occurring,
from a meta-position (Dimaggio et al. 2003; Hermans 2003; see also
Dimaggio’s chapter in this volume). By doing so, reconceptualization
also allows us to give coherence to the other, more episodic IMs; namely
action, reflection of protest and shaping a new narrative of the self.
Performing change IMs, which appear usually after reconceptualization,
represent the expansion of the change process into the future.
Our suggestions about the importance of the meta-position involved
in reconceptualization IMs are congruent with other dialogical scholars’
proposals. For example, Hermans (2003) has suggested that an observer
position which manages the repertoire of positions is a necessary condi-
tion for successful psychotherapeutic change. This same process has
been repeatedly researched by Dimaggio and colleagues (Dimaggio
and Lysaker 2010), regarding metacognitive processes in therapy.
Metacognition is a set of abilities, involving the capability to understand
one’s own (and others’) emotional and cognitive processes and change
them, which are stimulated in the psychotherapeutic process. This
research makes it clear that these abilities are lacking or underdeveloped
in the most disturbed patients (e.g. personality and psychotic disorders).
IMs, discontinuity and continuity restoration:
the centrality of uncertainty
What processes block the path of successful psychotherapy in poor
outcome cases? Why do the poor outcome cases fail to follow the pattern
of increasing duration of IMs and the development from action, reflec-
tion and protest IMs into reconceptualization and performing change, in
the middle and late phases of therapy?
Answering these questions involves taking into consideration IMs’
potential to generate discontinuity and uncertainty, given that every
innovation disrupts the usual, taken-for-granted, meaning-making pro-
cesses. In fact, as Abbey and Valsiner (2005) suggest, ‘all development is
inherently based on overcoming uncertainty’ (paragraph 14). When a
system is disrupted by a significant modification, discontinuity is gener-
ated and the system must be rearranged or modified until relative
stability is found again (Zittoun 2007). Accordingly, Hermans and
Dimaggio have pointed out that although ‘uncertainty challenges our
potential for innovation and creativity to the utmost’, it also ‘entails the
risks of a defensive and monological closure of the self and the unjusti-
fied dominance of some voices over others’ (2007: 10).
Thus, sometimes, the emergence of IMs leads the self to strive to
restore its sense of continuity, protecting itself from uncertainty, by
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aborting novelty exploration and returning to the dominant previous
self-narrative. In the next section we further discuss this defensive move-
ment facing innovation, which, if persistent during psychotherapeutic
treatment, could lead to an unsuccessful outcome.
Mutual in-feeding and problematic self-stability
Each IM can be construed as a microgenetic bifurcation point (Valsiner
and Sato 2006), in which the client has to resolve uncertainty; that is, the
tension between two opposing voices – one expressed in the dominant
self-narrative and the other expressed in the emerging IM. The client
has to choose the direction of meaning construction, which, according
to Valsiner (2008), can entail either semiotic attenuation or semiotic
amplification.
Semiotic attenuation refers to the minimization, depreciation or trivi-
alization of a particular innovative way of acting, feeling or thinking; that
is, the maintenance of the old patterns. Inversely, semiotic amplification
refers to the expansion of a given innovative way of acting, feeling or
thinking, creating an opportunity to change and development to occur.
This represents, after the emergence of the innovative voice, its perman-
ence in the foreground, rejecting the control of the dominant voice.
Looking at the therapeutic change as a developmental process, we argue
that this microgenetic process, that is, choosing between IMs attenu-
ation and amplification at each bifurcation point, may influence
ontogeny by promoting change or protecting stability. This choice
depends on the dialogical relations between the problematic voice(s)
and innovative ones at a given moment and on the dialogical encounter
with an other – the therapist.
Frequently, in poor outcome cases, particularly in the initial and
middle phases of good outcome cases, clients tend to resolve the discon-
tinuity created by the emergence of an IM, by attenuating its meaning,
making a quick return to the dominant self-narrative. This may result in
the disappearance of a particular innovative way of feeling, thinking or
acting (Figure 17.1), reinforcing the power of the dominant self-narrative
and, thus, promoting self-stability. By doing so, clients temporarily
avoid discontinuity, but do not overcome it, as the non-dominant voice
continues to be active and, thus, IMs emerge recurrently. Hence, each
new IM is a new opportunity for a new attenuation through the return to
the dominant self-narrative. In some cases this struggle between the
dominant self-narrative and the IMs continues during the entire psycho-
therapeutic process. We have here two opposing wishes (expressed by
two opposing voices): to keep the self stable, avoiding discontinuity and
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the uncertainty generated by it, and to change the self, avoiding the
suffering which the dominant self-narrative implies. When novelty
emerges, the person ‘resolves’ the problem of discontinuity by returning
to the dominant narrative. When the client feels too oppressed by the
dominant self-narrative, he or she ‘resolves’ this problem by trying to
produce novelty, but of course this poses the problem of discontinuity
once again. Thus, the self is trapped in this cyclical relation, making
ambivalence impossible to overcome within this form itself. This mirrors
a form of stability within the self, in which two opposite I-positions keep
feeding each other, dominating the self alternatively, a process which
Valsiner (2002) has called ‘mutual in-feeding’ (see also Gonc¸alves et al.
2009; Gonc¸alves, Ribeiro, Conde et al. in press).
Mutual in-feeding allows for the maintenance of the person’s status
quo, protecting one’s self-identity and sense of integrity or coherence
But it was just for a couple of hours!
(Return to the problematic
self-narrative)
However, yesterday I felt better.
I managed to go out and
felt like fighting the sadness.
I’ve been sad all my life! It’s just
the way I am!
(Problematic self-narrative)
Lately, I’ve been invariably sad,
crying all the time!
(Problematic self-narrative)
Figure 17.1 Restoring continuity through semiotic attenuation.
Source: Ribeiro and Gonc¸alves (2010). Adapted with permission.
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(Ecker and Hulley 1996; Kelly 1955; Mahoney 1991). People who seek
psychotherapeutic help look for personal change but often discover that
change creates unpredictability and uncontrollability (Arkovitz and
Engle 2007).
In what follows, it is not our intention fully to address why clients
‘resist’ change, but rather to draw attention to the dialogical processes
involved in the maintenance of self-narratives in psychotherapy and the
way we have been empirically observing them.
The empirical study of mutual in-feeding:
the return-to-the-problem markers
Wehave proposed ameasure of themutual in-feeding process which grew
from our observations of therapy passages in which an IM emerged and is
immediately followed by a return to the problematic experience. We
called such events a return-to-the-problem marker (RPM). For example:
I don’t want to be depressed anymore (reflection IM), but I just can’t (RPM).
In this example, the client described an IM – I don’t want to be depressed
anymore – and then returned to the problematic voice by saying, but
I can’t. This clause introduced by the word but represents opposition or
negation towards what is being said and hence constitutes the RPM.
The results obtained in a sample of narrative therapy with women
victims of domestic violence showed that IMs were much more likely to
be followed by a return to the dominant self-narrative in poor outcome
cases than in good outcome cases (Gonc¸alves, Ribeiro, Conde et al. in
press). Even though the cases had similar levels of symptom severity
at intake, poor outcome cases showed dramatically higher percentages
of IMs containing RPMs. This observation is consistent with the theoret-
ical suggestion that mutual in-feeding between the dominant self-
narrative and IMs can interfere with therapeutic progress (Gonc¸alves
et al. 2009). Furthermore, we found a lower incidence of RPMs in
reconceptualization and performing change IMs than in reflection and
protest IMs, and this is congruent with the theoretical assumptions
(Gonc¸alves, Ribeiro, Conde et al. in press), corroborating reconceptuali-
zation and performing change asmarkers of sustained therapeutic change.
Overcoming mutual in-feeding throughout
the therapeutic process
Although RPMs as a marker of mutual in-feeding are more characteristic
of unsuccessful psychotherapy, they may also offer opportunities for
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constructive therapeutic work. In fact, when mutual in-feeding is
overcome, it could facilitate the change process, given that the
struggle between the opposing voices is solved. Therefore, we have
initiated a line of intensive qualitative research into how RPMs can
turn into therapeutic movement; that is, how the relation between
non-dominant voices and the dominant voices evolves from mutual
in-feeding to another form of dialogical relation. Hitherto, we have
identified two possible processes: (1) Escalation of the non-dominant
voice(s) and thereby inhibiting the dominant voice, and (2) negotiating
and engaging in joint action. Below, these processes are illustrated in two
cases.
Overcoming mutual in-feeding through escalation
of the non-dominant voice(s) and thereby inhibiting
the dominant voice: the case of Susan
Susan (a pseudonym) was a 38-year-old participant in a study of IMs in
women victims of intimate violence followed in narrative therapy (Matos
et al. 2009). In the initial phase of the therapy, Susan often oscillated
between two contrasting positions: the dominant voice, which was
described as justifying her husband’s violent behaviours and even feeling
responsible for them, leading her to keep forgiving him (e.g. ‘things will
change as time goes by’) – a forgiving voice – and the non-dominant
voice, which was described as thoughts and feelings that challenge the
forgiving voice; that is, realizing that her husband was responsible for
his actions and resisting internal and external pressures to forgive him
(e.g. ‘I’ve had enough!’) – a resisting voice.
The following example illustrates the escalation of the resisting voice
and the subsequent inhibition of the forgiving voice, resolving mutual
in-feeding.
susan: I see things from another perspective . . . I no longer excuse
or minimize his violent behaviour . . . It’s gone
[referring to the forgiving voice].
therapist : It’s curious . . . because there are a lot of people trying to
convince you.
susan: The more people try to convince me that I must forgive him,
the more I convince myself that things cannot be fixed.
therapist : What helps you resist others’ pressures to excuse him?
susan: I realized that things were worse than I ever imagined! . . . I used
to repress my feelings because I used to believe that if
I thought too much about it I would become very depressed
and wouldn’t be able to take care of my son . . . Now, I let
things come [reconceptualization IM].
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In this example, as a result of realizing that ‘things were worse than I ever
imagined!’, the resisting voice escalates (‘I no longer excuse or minimize
his violent behaviour’) and strives towards regulating the forgiving voice
(‘I convince myself that things cannot be fixed’), inhibiting its power
(‘It’s gone [referring to the forgiving voice]’).
This dialogical process can move towards a monological outcome (see
Valsiner 2000 on process versus outcome distinction) since, although the
opposing voices are in dialogue, the type of interaction is very asymmet-
rical. Hermans (1996a, 1996b) has characterized this process as a form
of dominance reversal: the position that was once dominant is now
dominated. However, in this example, the process does not stop with
the reversal of the I-positions; there is an escalation of the power of the
resisting voice and a strong inhibition of the dominated I-position, in this
case the forgiving voice.
One can argue that this process of escalating one voice and inhib-
ition of the other may risk creating another dominant self-narrative,
given that once again a dominant I-position took over the others.
However, we suspect that sometimes meaningful clinical changes
occur by this process, as in Susan’s case. First, the new dominant
voice is more adjusted and congruent with Susan’s preferences.
Second, the dominance did not occur automatically, but resulted from
the client’s choice. We proposed that this was mediated by a meta-
position over the reversal process, without which a reversal of positions
may have been a mere substitution of one problematic pattern for
another. Actually, this meta-position is present in the reconceptualiza-
tion IMs as it was described before.
From our narrative view, and following Sarbin (1986), we suggest that
the first form of dominance, which was present in the beginning of
therapy in Susan’s case, has positioned her as the actor of a narrative
which she did not author. In the last form of dominance, Susan was
the author of her own plot. We further suggest that the meta-position
involved in the dominance reversal is essential to ensure this position
of authorship. One important reason is that there is not only one
position which dominates and silences others, but also a third one
which manages the kind of dominance involved. Instead of two forces
opposing each other, we have three positions: the dominant, the non-
dominant and the meta-position which manages them. Thus, this new
form of dominance is much more flexible than the previous one, and this
flexibility is in part ensured by the meta-position (or authorship)
involved.
In some cases, this asymmetrical regulation may be a transitory stage
in the process of change, facilitating the client’s adaptation to the
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immediate future in a given moment (e.g. a specific decision-making
process: to leave or not to leave home, in the case of Susan). For
instance, Susan worked towards the inhibition of the forgiving voice,
which, according to her, was harmful. Congruently, these moments of
monologization, in which a specific voice considered as helpful ‘func-
tion[s] at a certain moment as an anchorage point around which the
entire self-system organizes itself ’ (Rosa and Gonc¸alves 2008: 103),
may be effective in the reduction of the ambivalence. Thus, this
process of voices reversal may be a temporary stage which facilitates
other subsequent, meaningful changes. While in the beginning Susan’s
life was constrained by the forgiving voice, and she was left without
any choice about her future (besides continuing to forgive the abuse),
now the dominance of the resisting voice allows new I-positions to
come to the fore. For instance, Susan started to invest in a broader
multiplicity of positions (‘there are things that I recovered, things that
I am doing again and that I will never again give up doing’). Thus, the
potentiality for monologization of the self is precluded not only by the
meta-position we referred above, but also by the multiplicity of pos-
itions which were stimulated by the inhibition of the problematic voice
(the forgiving voice).
Overcoming mutual in-feeding through negotiating
and engaging in joint action: the case of Joan
Joan (a pseudonym)2 was a 42-year-old female participant in a random-
ized clinical trial comparing process experiential/emotion-focused ther-
apy with client-centred therapy (Greenberg and Watson 1998; see
Honos-Webb et al. 1999 for the analysis of the assimilation process in
this case).
In the beginning of therapy, Joan oscillated between two opposing
voices: the dominant voice, which was described as seeking others’
approval (e.g. ‘I guess I’m scared I’ll end up alone’) – a good-girl voice –
and the non-dominant voice, which was described as thoughts and feel-
ings that challenge the good-girl voice (e.g. ‘I think deep down I know I’m
strong enough that I could survive on my own’) – a rebellious voice.
The following example illustrates the negotiation between the
good-girl and the rebellious voices, resolving mutual in-feeding (a two-
chair3 dialogue between the good-girl voice and the rebellious voice):
joan: It’s always like I see myself as two split personalities [referring to
her two voices] as two altogether different people and. . .
therapist : So, who’s sitting there right now? Which one is sitting there?
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joan: I feel like the stronger part of me [referring to the rebellious
voice] now is thinking, go over and come together, and it’s
overpowering and overpowering the weaker person
[referring to the good-girl voice]. . .
joan: I wonder if it’s a way to, to be supportive and to lend strength
[reflection IM].
therapist : So kind of like . . . it just all of a sudden happened?
joan: Yes.
therapist : So somehow it’s almost like you didn’t have to ask her – for what
you wanted – and she didn’t have to sort of tell you, it’s sort
of like, she, just kind of came over and you feel stronger.
joan: It’s, it’s just like when I was there [sitting in the good-girl voice’s
chair] and I was feeling so vulnerable and weak, and then it
seemed like these [two voices] coming together as two
things . . . two people coming together is like, and one and all
of a sudden I felt like a lot stronger [reconceptualization
IM]. . .
joan: I guess we can confront the issues and talk to T. [husband] about
it, it doesn’t have to be so scary [reconceptualization IM].
In this example, the rebellious voice helped the good-girl feel stronger
and therefore confront the issues that disturb her instead of giving in.
The opposing voices appeared to be respectfully communicating with
one another (‘I wonder if it’s a way to, to be supportive’) and engaging in
joint action (‘I guess we can confront the issues and talk to T. [husband]
about it’).
This IM seemed to act as a meaning bridge, allowing both voices
to serve as resources (Brinegar et al. 2006) – ‘coming together as two
things . . . two people coming together’ – thus becoming a source of
flexibility in the self ’s meaning system, in so far as it appeared to enable
a conditional dynamic movement between the opposites, rather than a
fixation on one of them (J. Valsiner, personal communication, 16 May
2008). This is also akin to the concept of coalition of positions as
proposed by Hermans and Hermans-Konopka (2010).
Thus, as reflected in these two cases, one pattern of overcoming
mutual in-feeding promotes the escalating of previously silenced voices,
and the inhibition of the dominant voice, whereas another pattern opens
the space to negotiation between opposing voices, transforming the
opposition through mutual regulation. Regardless of their differences
in terms of dialogical outcome, both processes involve the development
of a meta-position, present in the reconceptualization IM, which is
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capable of communicating openly and effectively with other positions,
and having a function of management and coordination.
Reflecting about these two processes, we may hypothesize that the
kind of resolution depends on the type of therapeutic strategies used and
the problem the client is facing. Thus, specific strategies or exercises
focused on fostering clients’ reaction against the problem (e.g. cognitive
restructuring in cognitive-behavioural therapy or externalization in nar-
rative therapy) may support the dominance reversal, given the way
therapists support a counter-position to the problem. Other strategies
more centred on understanding and giving voice to different positions
(e.g. two-chair dialogue) may facilitate cooperative dialogue between the
positions involved.
Moreover, the case illustrations presented were very different from
each other as far as the type of the problem clients were facing is
concerned. Susan was coping with a very destructive situation as a victim
of her partner’s violence. Her situation in comparison with Joan’s was
much more severe and was clearly a situation of crisis (Roberts 2000).
We wonder whether, in situations in which the suffering is very disturb-
ing, as in Susan’ case, the inhibition of the maladaptive dominant voice
cannot be a necessary starting point to more complex changes. On the
other hand, when the suffering is less intense, perhaps stimulating a
cooperative dialogue between voices is an important resource to trans-
form the dominant self-narrative.
Implications for DST
In this section we discuss two implications of our work for DST: the
dialogical functions of reconceptualization, as a particular form of meta-
position, and the way multiplicity in the self produces stability or change.
As the IMs change model suggests, reconceptualization is fundamen-
tal in transforming self-narratives. Reconceptualization IMs occurred in
the clinical cases presented above, although, as we have also discussed,
the paths of change were very different in these two cases. One import-
ant ingredient of reconceptualization IMs is the presence of a contrast
between a past position and a current one, as well as access to the
processes which allow the transformation from one to the other. As
stated before, the articulation of the relationship between these two
positions is only possible by a third one: a meta-position (see Hermans
2003). Recently, Hermans and Konopka (2010) have argued that meta-
positions have three main functions: unifying, executive and liberating.
The unification refers to the way different I-positions are articulated or
put in contact by the action of the meta-position. The executive function
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results from the decision-making processes, in which the meta-position
has, at least temporarily, the power to organize the different positions
involved. Finally, the liberating function has to do with the ability that
the self has to stop habitual or automatic patterns associated with
common positions and give priority to new ones, less automatic. In fact,
these functions are very clear in reconceptualization: past and present
have a temporal integration which gives meaning to the transition
(unifying function), the present position is preferred and gets priority
(executive function), and former habitual patterns, present in the dom-
inant (problematic) self-narratives, are disrupted and stopped (liberating
function).
One interesting phenomenon, from our perspective, is the repetition
of reconceptualization in psychotherapy. As we stated before, reconcep-
tualization emerges in successful psychotherapy in the middle of the
treatment and increases until the end. In fact, quite often reconceptua-
lization IMs represent the most common form of innovation in psycho-
therapy, occupying a significant amount of time. We believe that this
repetition of different reconceptualization IMs is in fact therapeutic and
no significant change would occur without it. Moreover, reconceptuali-
zation does not involve a meta-position between two current positions,
but rather a meta-position that articulates a past position and an
emerging new one. Thus, we propose that a fourth function of a meta-
position is present here: a developmental one. That is, through the
repetition of the meta-positioning involved in reconceptualization a dis-
identification with the past I-position occurs, concomitantly with a pro-
gressive identification with the emerging novelty, transforming the self in
the process (Cunha et al. in press). This would explain the need of some
redundancy of reconceptualization in psychotherapy (and perhaps also
in every significant life transformation).
A second implication of our approach to the study of the dialogical self
relates to the processes through which multiplicity of the self produces
stability or change. This chapter shows that when uncertainty and
ambivalence are not overcome throughout the therapeutic process, the
dominant I-positions (present in the dominant narrative) and alternative
ones (present in IMs) may establish a cyclical relation throughout the
therapeutic process – a process of mutual in-feeding – blocking the
development of the dialogical self. In such a case, ‘the self-system is
dynamic, but not developmental’ (Valsiner 2002: 260).
This alternation between two opposite positions is more monological
(at least as an outcome) than dialogical. This relates to a proposal from
Hermans and Konopka (2010) about the nature of ‘good dialogue’.
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Moreover, from their point of view, the presence of two or more pos-
itions (internal and/or external) does not guarantee that dialogue will
occur. One of the features of good dialogue is the production of some
form of innovation, in which each participant takes the other into con-
sideration and is open to change their own perspective in response to the
other. This is exactly what is absent when mutual in-feeding is not
resolved. The two positions keep alternating without any resonance to
the other’s perspective. They are each of them closed inside itself, not
responding to the other, but just reacting to the other. That is, in the
response, the other position is not integrated, and the original position
stays unchanged. Thus, a mere automatic reaction (and not a responsive
response) keeps going on, as illustrated above.
We have shown two types of resolutions for these situations: one, in
which one position is temporarily blocked, and the other develops, and
the other, in which the two positions enter into dialogue. The last
resolution is congruent with the notion of ‘good dialogue’. Of course,
our chapter illustrates that this might not always be possible, and that
change may start when the problematic position is blocked. One inter-
esting question that remains for future studies is whether, for solid
therapeutic change to occur, ‘good dialogue’ must be present at some
point of the process.
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NOTES
1 The concept of IM is a methodological application of the concept of unique
outcome proposed by White and Epston (1990) (see Gonc¸alves et al. 2009, for
an explanation about this topic).
2 This original pseudonym of this case was ‘Jan’. We changed the pseudonym
here to ‘Joan’ since in several languages Jan is a male name.
3 Two-chair work has its roots in gestalt therapy as described by Perls et al.
(1951) and has been adapted and further developed by Greenberg and col-
leagues (e.g. Greenberg et al. 1993). This therapeutic task involves identifying
two discrepant (often conflicting) parts of the self, and putting each one on a
separate chair. The client is then coached to speak for each of the parts in turn,
thus creating a dialogue between the two parts.
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